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The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke

By STERLING POWER LAMPRECHT, Ph.D.

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This study makes an important contribution to a much neglected side of Locke's philosophy. No previous study is so wide in its scope or so thorough in its method. It places Locke's empiricism and theory of knowledge in relationship to his other interests, and thus gives to the examination of Locke's philosophy the proper historical perspective. The modern student of moral and political philosophy will find in the work illumination of many current ideas.

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

INSTRUMENTAL TRANSFORMISM AND THE UNREALITIES OF REALISM

THE instrumentalists in philosophy are reaping a rich harvest of criticism and contempt because of the wild oats they have sown. But as true votaries of a genuine empiricism they do not deny the excesses of their youth. Not by way of excusing their excesses, but by way of explaining them, do the pragmatists describe the original state of their rebellion from the traditions of philosophy. It was because pragmatism arose as a criticism of the closed system of absolute idealism that James rejected logic, fairly, squarely and irrevocably.[1] And because the pragmatist could not tolerate the implication that the value of thought was to be judged by an external correspondence of ideas to "Reality," he laid himself open to the charge that truth is what gives satisfaction.[2] In spite of the fact that besides the criterion of the satisfaction of practical needs, James also insisted upon the agreement of thought with actual objects, and in spite of the fact that the instrumentalist disclaims all responsibility for the former criterion,[3] it is precisely that one which is still held up to instrumentalism as its cardinal error. We observe then that not because instrumentalism is really responsible for the sins imputed to it, is it willing to trace its growth from a precarious position, but because it hopes thereby to contribute to the clarification of thought.

The outstanding criticisms of the instrumental attitude made by both the idealists and new realists may be summed up in two coordinate propositions. The first asserts that the instrumentalist has no logic, because he is interested merely in the satisfaction of practical needs. The second point in the indictment is that instrumentalism leaves no place for solidity; its world is entirely elusive and arbitrary. Since the issue seems so definite, this paper proposes to review some of the salient features of instrumental logic by way of clearing up some points of agreement and disagreement between the instru-

[1] *A Pluralistic Universe*, Lecture V., p. 212.

[2] James: *Pragmatism*. Lectures II. and VI.; *cf.* Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 320 ff.

[3] Dewey: *op. cit.*, p. 331.

mentalist and his critics. The way to this task is indicated by the fact that for the instrumentalist as for the realist, logic is the essence of philosophy.

Instrumentalism considers its most positive achievement to be the capacity to bring order and system into a world of shifting occurrences. It is the necessity to relate things which makes a logic necessary at all, and in the fact that instrumental logic is able to do this lies its fundamental significance. Instrumental logic is not a self-subsisting activity indulged in for its own sake; rather, it is purposive and makes for some factual reconstruction indicated by the emergence of some actual problem. Its function is to carry us over from one event to another, making our world meaningful and our actions with respect to it possible and worth while. The essence of logic is to give meaning to objects and events by way of evaluating them, and this means to connect them with our previous and present experience. This kind of logic gives thought its wings, not the logic of absolute relations.[5] And to borrow an excellent description from Russell, instrumental logic "brings with it—as a new and powerful method of investigation always does—a sense of power and a hope of progress more reliable and better grounded than any that rests on hasty and fallacious generalizations as to the nature of the universe at large."[6]

The process of giving meaning to objects and their relations is the work of the categorization function in the course of scientific analysis and synthetic generalization. These last-mentioned processes refer to the way in which we start with a specific happening, say the explosion of a chemical substance which for the present confuses our world of reality, and end with a solution of our defined problem and the consequent enlargement of reality. It is at this point that the instrumentalist unblushingly asserts that he constantly creates[7] his world anew.[8] And this is because for him the world is a denotative term for men, metals, electricity, steam, and all other things, forces and processes with which he actually deals. It is not absurd to expect the public to believe that man can transform his world in order to further his activity, since everybody can see it done. To deny the possibility of this is to deny the function and

[4] *Cf.* Russell: *Scientific Method in Philosophy,* pp. 33, 239 and elsewhere.

[5] *Cf.* Russell: *op. cit.,* p. 59.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 30. *Cf.* Dewey's criticism of Russell's problem of the "world," *Essays in Experimental Logic,* Chap. XI.

[7] Note that this creation is always a transformation of crude facts into every-day knowledge, and scientific facts and laws. The problem of the universe at large as formulated by the idealist and realist is never involved.

[8] *Cf.* Caldwell: *Pragmatism and Idealism,* p. 135.

progress of science and knowledge. We may place our finger upon the nerve of the absolutist's criticism of instrumentalism by indicating that the critic never is talking about the instrumentalist's world. The pragmatic attitude is to disclaim all commerce with, and knowledge of the eternal worlds of the idealist and the realist, and the instrumentalist is entirely willing to forego all powers with respect to them.[9]

The question arises as to whether the instrumentalist's insistence that he is constantly retransforming his world means that he makes it an arbitrary construction. Such a question is impossible when we remember that the values or determinations which the scientist gives to the objects with which he deals, are tools forged in the course of actual contact with things, and are designed to increase the possibilities of such contacts. The categories of instrumentalism enlarge and further experience by discovery of larger implications of facts. It is not at all to the point to argue that, after all, nothing is created and that we must look upon the new objects of science as having always existed. The instrumentalist insists that the world was very considerably remade when Faraday discovered that "static electric charges and forces were dependent upon the characteristics of the material substance in which electrified bodies were immersed," and still further remade when Hertz showed experimentally that electro-magnetic energy passed through vacuous space, and that this radiant energy was undoubtedly of the same type as light and heat.[10] We must be sure of our ground at this point, and insist that it is precisely because the instrumentalist is thinking in terms of human actions and the possibility of increasing those actions and capacities for action, that his recategorization of the world at the point of specific problems means a transformation by creative discovery of that world.[11]

Besides the criticism with which we have just dealt, namely the conception that the work of science is not a transformation of the "real" world, there is another type of criticism which claims to be more scientific, and takes the form that while these transformations are possible and do occur, they do so because they answer to a set of absolute laws. These thinkers start from scientific premises; that is, the new realists mean to discuss logic as operating in a domain of scientific fact, although they soon get far away from that position. To insist that our knowledge is such as it is, because there are absolute laws and relations, if not logical atoms, eternally existing in the

[9] *Cf.* Russell: *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[10] More: *The Limitations of Science*, p. 160.
[11] *Cf.* Mead: *Creative Intelligence*, p. 225.

world, is entirely a non-scientific attitude, since the work of science is precisely to determine just what laws, relations and things exist. The realist suggests that he really means that if we hold up as an ideal the existence of such absolute laws we won't blame nature for our mistakes but only ourselves.[12] In this statement lies the fallacy of thinking that the work of evaluating objects and relations is a trivial occupation, and that we need only have a worthless promise to keep us at our task. This viewpoint entirely overlooks the fact that our task of evaluation is a process of making our difficult way with unrelenting facts, which are constantly presenting us with newer and more complex problems. The realist forgets that it is the instrumentalist who is developing a logic of things, and moreover a logic of genuine things.[13] For this reason the instrumentalist has no problem as to why he succeeds;[14] he succeeds because he sets himself no false problems, but works zealously at those nature sets him, and every one interested in nature knows that such an occupation leaves no time to pursue supernatural mysteries. And by the same token the logic of absolute relations must always be seeking and never finding, because it starts with the presupposition that real things are metaphysical.[15] It is not a perversion of the realistic logic to make it end with logical atoms as Costello asserts;[16] that is the way it must end, unless one does what Costello would do, namely, forget the atoms and leave their systems of relations.[17] And when Costello does this the question arises as to whether he accomplishes more than he asserts the idealistic logicians do, namely revive the Greek concept of perfection. The idealist might reply that Costello does not do so much, namely that his system is just as arbitrary but not so perfect. Costello maintains his pious hope concerning the final outcome of the "truly relational" logic because he thinks it is not what he calls one of the old logics with a new face.[18]

The new realists condemn all those who can not believe that there are reals in experience, that there are in science eternal and immutable laws. "The laws of space, number and of matter and energy have not changed from the times of Euclid and Pythagoras and Archimedes; the laws of gasoline engines were just the same in the days of the ancient Athenians as now. We know them and they did

[12] *Cf.* Costello: *Studies in the History of Ideas*, Columbia University, 1918, p. 257.

[13] *Cf.* Costello: *ibid.*, p. 267.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 257.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 262.

[18] It has become a favorite form of self-delusion with the new realists to think that they have little or nothing in common with Aristotle.

not.''[19] And Montague might have added that these laws were just the same thousands and thousands of centuries before Athens. In attempting to find some meaning in this statement we might begin by asking whether the new realist means to say that he believes uncritically there must be changeless laws of space and number and so on throughout the whole range of science. The question is suggested by the fact that Montague mentions Euclid in connection with the laws of space, and of course Montague would hardly care to say that the Euclidean law is an immutable law of space.[20] He probably would be just as unwilling to say that Lobatchewsky's law is an absolute law of space, and if so the result is that Montague stands for absolute laws which merely ''are,'' but which nobody knows and which have nothing to do with science. But no, Montague says we know these absolute laws, while only the Athenians did not. There are two questions raised here; the first is why doesn't Montague state what these absolute laws are; LeRoy, Mach, Duhem, Poincaré and others were forced to confess their inability to find them. The second question is what right has Montague to declare that in the two thousand years ahead of us there won't be such progress made in the discovery of absolute laws as in the two thousand years past.

But let us not hold Montague too rigidly to his statement. He might with excellent ground argue against the extreme contingentists who seem to deny any stability in science. Montague might then mean that we do not know any absolute laws but that unless there were such laws, events would not occur as they do. In other words Montague might mean that there must be laws, in the sense that the idealist thinks there must be a world, behind phenomena. Professor Dewey has convincingly discussed this situation.[21] He refers to the case of a man who has been rescued from drowning under peculiarly precarious circumstances. A bystander remarks that now he is a saved man. ''Yes,'' replies someone, ''but he was a saved man all the time, and the process of rescuing, while it gives evidence of the fact, does not constitute it.'' Dewey is discussing the problem of the truth of ideas, but the illustration has point here. The realist seems to believe that whatever happens, happens because of immutable laws, and not that because things happen thus and thus we can frame by induction various laws; and thus he differs from the instrumentalist who considers that were it not for pulling the man out of the water, there would have been no saved man. The ultimate laws of

[19] Montague: *Studies in the History of Ideas*, p. 236.

[20] Note that he has just said the Athenians did not know these absolute laws, but I mean to suggest that there might be good reasons for not taking the Euclidean law as the absolute one.

[21] *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and other Essays*, p. 143.

science as the instrumentalist reinterprets the new realistic standpoint, are nothing more than evaluations of phenomena, their behavior and relations, which are formulated in handling these phenomena in actual scientific pursuits; and from the pragmatic standpoint these ultimate laws are nothing less than the means by which the world of things becomes intelligible to us and amenable to our reconstructions of it.

The instrumentalist is entirely in sympathy with the new realist in asserting the existence of definite laws of science. The former is keenly aware of the brute stubbornness of facts, and the lack of arbitrariness in things, but this does not drive him to believe in unknown and unknowable laws, which always imply a metaphysics which can mean nothing and accomplish nothing. The instrumentalist, working always with concrete problems, looks upon the laws of science as broad and general evaluations derived from a long experience with actual things. Since the entire procedure of knowledge is to understand and control phenomena, it is obvious that man can not create the crude facts with which he is dealing. It is these crude facts which are given. All the crude facts of disease, the organization and decomposition of matter, the changes in geological structure and on through all the myriads of happenings among which the scientist works, are not made by him. They do not depend upon him for their crude existence or their crude laws. Even if we overlook the work of Wolff, Mirbel, Von Baer and others, we must say that the crude facts of cellular biology were given to and not made by Schwann and Schleiden; but is it possible to overlook the difference between biological reality before and after their work? Similarly, Newton did not create the crude facts of gravitation, nor Darwin those of transformation of species, but if these men are taken as examples of scientists their accomplishment in transforming the world is unequivocal. We are immediately brought face to face with the problem of the relation of science to its crude facts. In a general way this is the problem of the relation of things known to things. All science and philosophy deal with observable things and relations. Perhaps one of the first facts about things is that we observe them differently. Our contact with things depends upon our previous observations and these differ with each person. In order to generalize them for our scientific purposes we must adopt standards of reference. These latter become laws of things known and are independent of the individuals whose observations go to make these laws.

Our laws of mechanics whose sole validity and value lie in their character as genuine evaluations of our crude every-day facts, do not of course precisely represent any specific event. It is because these

laws are made for the guidance and enlargement of action that they are made universal, in the sense that they answer to all, though not precisely to any specific fact. Thus, to borrow some examples from Aliotta, "according to the laws of pure mechanics, a pendulum should continue its isochronous oscillations to all eternity, whereas it stops after a certain time; a projectile thrown in a straight line should pursue the same direction with a uniform motion *ad infinitum*, whereas in reality we see it fall after having described a parabola."[22] These laws are rigid and independent in so far as our evaluations of things are rigidly determined with reference to the actual things from which they are abstracts and interpretations. This condition accounts for the difference in absoluteness of scientific laws. The fact is that all laws, being after all laws of things observed, are subject to modification, and revision.[23] These modifications are the natural consequences of meeting with new phenomena in the ordinary course of human life. The conflicts of science are occasioned by the discovery of an exception to a law which was formulated on the basis of certain observed facts. In such cases the laws are expanded to include the new phenomena. It is because the new realist fails to appreciate the true nature of a scientific law that he assumes that there are conflicts between immutable laws and perceptual facts, or between reason and sense. To quote Montague as an example, we find that what he considers a conflict between a law and a perceptual fact, is the type of puzzle which Zeno first formulated.[24]

The instrumentalist is far from denying the independence of reality, but when this independence signifies anything he considers it a limiting conception, in the same sense that the law of conservation of matter or energy is a limiting conception. It is a formulation of related events which makes for freedom and variety of action and knowledge. There is nothing arbitrary or artificial about these laws, since the scientist is dealing with actual things, well named by Poincaré crude facts; these crude facts stimulate the scientist to evaluate them as scientific facts, and to formulate them into scientific laws. Of course Poincaré is seriously at fault in thinking that all the scientist does is to create the language in which he enunciates facts.[25] The evaluations of the scientist consist of a working over of the specific crude facts by comparison and testing into a scientific fact,

[22] *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, p. 338.

[23] It is because Russell considers the laws of science as entirely without relation to actual empirical happenings, that he thinks these laws absolute. *Cf. Principles of Mathematics*, p. 493.

[24] *Cf. Studies in the History of Ideas*, pp. 228 ff.

[25] *The Foundations of Science*, p. 332.

which makes for an enlargement of the domain of science into which the crude fact forced its entry. The crude facts are not lost, but integrated, and this is the reason that the scientific manipulation transforms genuine reality. The complete world of science, if it is genuine and critical, would constitute the entire world of things and relations. The facts of science must be looked upon as the crude facts of naïve experience standardized, criticized, and interpreted.

The range of categories for the instrumentalist would therefore cover all phases of phenomena, whether the crude facts of our everyday life or the most abstract determinations of science and philosophy. The point is that every category represents in its final analysis some kind of contact of a human being with objects or events. In the lowest stages of this interpretation procedure the categories merely stand for the particular contact, while in science and philosophy the categories represent the most intimate significance of these contacts. In the latter cases it is not important merely to know that the contacts have occurred, but to understand them and to increase their possibilities.

The instrumentalist looks upon the categories time, space, motion, causality and force as values abstracted from actual empirical phenomena for the purpose of controlling them. Causality is a category which aids us in the work of organizing successive facts in a world of rapidly shifting experiences. It enables us to relate in specific ways older and newer experiences, thus giving a serviceable continuity to the world of changing things. The category of substance, for example, is a scientific evaluation designed to reach back to certain specific qualities or conditions of things. The instrumental character of the categories lies in the fact that, although not themselves concrete things, they enable us to deal with those things. Depending upon the functional value of the categories for specific scientific purposes, substance, for example, may be further characterized as matter, energy or electricity, and as Brown[26] has pointed out it happens to be most useful in science to-day to make no separation between the categories of matter and energy.

We must point out again that in all cases in which the categories are of actual service in the control of certain phenomena, they are derived from those phenomena. Thus, Euclidean space is the space of science because it is built up through actual contact with things, and consequently is the most serviceable in the description and control of such things. When data will accumulate which can not be handled by Euclidean space, then a multidimensional space will have to be employed. It is only in so far as mathematical physics is not

[26] This JOURNAL, XIV., p. 64.

employed with the immediate control of phenomena that it may posit a multidimensional space, and reduce matter or substance to quantity. The main point here is that the abstract concepts of science are developed in an attempt to control the fallings and breakings, the movings and restings of actual things, now, a while ago, and in the hours to come. Since these objects and events are real, the evaluations which are continuations and elaborations of them must also be real. The instrumentalists are the last persons on earth to be called nihilists or nominalists, since the former start and end with the only sort of reality there is. The instrumentalists have thus in common with the fictionist[27] and the contingentist[28] the idea that science and its categories are instruments in the service of man. But unlike the fictionist the instrumentalist derives his categories from actual events and tests them by those events; consequently these categories are realities, and this characteristic applies to all evaluations, whether of the physical, biological or social sciences. The instrumentalist differs from the contingentist in that the categories for the former are merely realities for action. The instrumentalist recognizes no other reality than the world of naïve phenomena, whether described as the durational immediacy of the intuitionist, known through philosophical categories, or as an extremely mediate reality of the Neo-Kantians, which is never known at all. And so while the instrumentalist is a realist, he differs widely from the new or presentative realists, since we have already observed that their reality comes to be a series of unknown entities far removed from actual things.

Our study thus far has indicated that the categories or determinations of experience must represent a graded series which reach down below the level of cognition. The categories in our perceptual experiences are not knowledge elements in any genuine sense. Our primary categories are reactions or modes of response to objects. What things mean is merely the way we react to them. During the course of our experience with these things we find that with the capacity to control our responses there is correlated the process of lifting meanings out of the field of actual happening; that is, things are pointed out, intended and known. The primary function of scientific concepts or categories is to give us a means of control over our experiences. It is extremely essential therefore that these categories should have the broadest identity with and reference to original happenings.

The question arises as to what the specific function of the philosophical categories are, and it is the lack of explicit statement con-

[27] Vaihinger.

[28] LeRoy, Mach, Bergson, *etc.*

cerning them which is one of the instrumentalist's most flagrant sins of omission.[29] The categories of philosophy are of course continuous with the categories of science and of every-day life. It is not at all a sign of the bankruptcy of philosophy[30] that it uses the same categories as science; it is rather a sign of progress and expansion, an indication that philosophy is accomplishing something, and signifying something. The idealist who seeks entirely other categories for philosophy, seeks, though he hesitates to say so, something that will carry him out of the actual world into a realm beyond. As a result the idealist criticizes the instrumentalist for thinking in terms of organism and environment, because the former mistakenly thinks that to remain in this concrete world of ours excludes him from a genuine spiritual life. It seems clear that the spiritual life the idealist wants has nothing to do with life, and that accounts for his inability to think of himself as a biological organism. What the idealist means when he opposes the instrumental movement is that it does not "express reality in its completeness."[31] And when he speaks of philosophical adventure[32] and freedom of reason[33] he is speaking of a "yearning soul which first expresses itself in loyalty to society and in good citizenship, but which can find no final satisfaction until it completes itself in the knowledge and thought of God, in union with whom alone the individual comes to be that which he really is."[34]

The instrumentalist must look upon philosophy as theoretical science; its material is precisely that of science, but its attitude is broader. Science has two closely related phases of activity that are still distinct. In the first place it is interested in the solution of immediate practical problems. In conformity with this interest it evaluates things precisely for the purposes at hand, without regard to their larger implications. The theoretical phase of science which makes for a larger control and understanding of phenomena is more critical in its determinations. Thus in order to solve some specific bio-chemical problem, for example, we make an absolutely mechanical determination of phenomena, while when we are interested in enlarging the scope of our researches we may very well question whether the phenomena of biology are entirely mechanical. For

[29] Here again there has not been an entire neglect of the matter, but because instrumentalism has faced the necessity of overcoming the inertia of absolutism, it has exposed itself to the charge of being anti-philosophical. *Cf.* Dewey: *The Subject Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry*, this JOURNAL, XII., p. 337.

[30] Howard, this JOURNAL, XV., p. 154.

[31] Bosanquet: *Realism and Metaphysics, Philos. Rev.*, XXVI., p. 8, quoted by Howard.

[32] Howard: *loc. cit.*, p. 156.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[34] Bosanquet: *The Principles of Individuality and Value*, p. 403.

some purposes we may think that things are absolutely static and without possibility of variation, while for others we may not make any such assumption. In a general way we think of the theoretical phases of science as checks on the practical pursuits; so the possibilities of changing our technique of investigation are not precluded by a prejudice of the case. The theoretical or philosophical determinations then, are in a way relatively ultimate, complete and final; that is, they remain unchanged, pending the discovery of new facts.[35]

This domain of theoretical science is a genuine speculative realm, in which the motive of practical accomplishment plays only such a part as to allow us to say that the phenomena involved are continuous with those of the specific sciences. In following out the function of the categories as the instrumentalist uses them, we find that the philosophical categories break across the boundaries of the specific sciences such as physical, biological and psychological, and determine phenomena on the basis of the factual contribution of all of these. Within the domain of the special sciences and various phases of practical life the use of categories peculiar to each domain must be rigidly adhered to. We can not fail to recognize the striking incongruity of using teleological categories as evaluations in the field of mechanics.

An important implication throughout the discussion of the instrumentalist's doctrine of categories is the significant place which consistency and correspondence play in the use of them. In the first place because the pragmatic attitude is an evaluation of actual things the evaluation must correspond to the concrete things evaluated. This is not of course a correspondence between mutually exclusive elements, but in the practical manipulation of science the categories stand over against actual things.[36] In the second place, since the values are primarily instruments for the enlargement of our contacts with the world of things, there must be a consistency in our attitudes. If our interest is merely to control a specific phenomenon, it is only necessary that the particular categories referring to it must hold together. We may thus have an indefinite number of categorization systems. But if our interest is theoretical, and we wish, for example, to test our evaluation of the substance of things, as energy or electricity, then there must not be within this domain any contradictions. On the one hand, since we are not interested in any absolute world presupposed prior to experience,[37] we may very well

[35] The practical solutions of science as compared with the theoretical are fleeting and tentative.

[36] We have indicated above that a scientific category does not refer to any particular thing.

[37] What Dewey calls creational and eschatological interests, this JOURNAL, XII., p. 354.

consider our evaluation systems as mutually incompatible. And because we may not in all our activities of evaluation be interested in specific problems, but in the continuity and significance of our general knowledge of things we must have our categories carry over from one realm of science to another, and thus cohere in a functional totality.

It is an entire misrepresentation to say the instrumentalist abhors systems.[38] What he does abhor are absolute systems which have no relevancy or significance and nothing to recommend them but their systematization. The realist clearly criticizes the instrumentalist for not building systems, merely for the sake of building[39] them, in spite of the latter's constant reiteration that his systems must serve some function. The instrumentalist is constantly campaigning; his whole method is that of overcoming the autocracy and arrogance of the brute facts of experience, but he can never merely campaign, just for the sake of campaigning. He has discovered by hard experience that to approach scientific problems with empty abstractions and ready-made systems is like equipping an army to-day with blunderbusses and brass cannon. Each problem is unique and the instruments to solve it must arise out of the situation at hand. To believe otherwise is to believe in a set of eternal and unchangeable conditions which must forever lie beyond the pale of verifiable science.

To summarize, the instrumental movement represents one of the specific types of reaction to absolutism, which is slowly but persistently being forced out of philosophy. Among other reactions to absolutism, that known as new realism is characterized by the fact that it merely shifts the ground of the absolutism, and instead of conceiving reality as being behind experience, puts it into experience as absolute entities, relations or immutable laws. As over against this presentative realistic position, instrumentalism denies all absolutes, whether essences, relations or laws. It considers the work of science and philosophy not to be that of finding reals in experience, but assumes that our actual world of concrete things and events is real, and that there is nothing beyond or behind them. Thus the facts and laws derived from this domain of reality are reals, but still subject to the transforming influence of the creative evaluation of science. To assert the existence of any absolute thing or relation is to fly in the face of all scientific facts. This last proposition includes all absolutes, and so the instrumentalist refutes the idea of Mach and his disciples, that reality is reducible to mental states,[40] by pointing

[38] *Cf.* Costello: this JOURNAL, XV., pp. 60 ff.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[40] *Science of Mechanics*, 1917, p. 482. Analysis of the Sensations, Introductory remarks, and elsewhere.

out that these sensations are themselves abstractions from things and can not therefore be their underlying reality. Sensations are categories referring to certain specific qualities of things during the course of their interpretation. It is clear that the instrumentalist is a frank and consistent, naïve or common sense realist, and takes as his ultimates the crude facts of every-day experience. He takes to be real only that which can be observed, tested, and made to yield conviction by proving genuine in the course of experimentation.

And thus because the instrumentalist is not an idealistic creator nor possessed of a transcendental reason capable of grasping absolute reality in the new realistic manner, he does not set over against his philosophical method an impossible task. And finally, since instrumental logic is the method of science it is submitted to thinkers upon its merits. What is claimed for it is that it will increase man's capacity to understand and control phenomena, that is, real things. In support of this claim we may point out that the critics of instrumentalism have never really disputed it, but have attacked the pragmatic attitude because it can not yield absolute reality. Our study has indicated that absolute reality is an unsound fabrication. Is it fair then, to condemn the instrumental method because it can not find phantoms that it does not seek?

J. R. KANTOR.

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SOCIETIES

THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE Western Philosophical Association held its nineteenth annual meeting at the State University of Iowa, Iowa City, on April 18 and 19, 1919. The programme covered a fairly wide range of topics, though the major emphases fell on political philosophy and on the present obligations and opportunities of philosophy in the fields of educational and, more generally, of social reconstruction. While there were few instances of what might properly be called a clash of opinion, there were many delightful differences as to the manner in which subjects were approached and viewed. This was strikingly true of the symposium on "The Function of Philosophy in Social Reconstruction." The subject was in this instance illumined from the standpoints of the history of philosophy and of culture, of ethical reflection, of psychological description and analysis, and of metaphysics. In all, twelve institutions were repre-

sented by the readers of papers, and as many more institutions had representatives who participated actively in making the discussions and the meeting as a whole a distinct success.

The presidential address was this year given by Professor Henry W. Wright, on the topic, "The Social Purpose of Education." President Wright set forth most cogently the limitations of those theories of education which have been dominated by biological concepts. This prepared the way for the thesis that the primary function of education consists in developing capacities and experiences which will enable individuals to share, and also to promote, the social life. This social life, Professor Wright convincingly maintained, can and should find expression in the field of technical achievement no less than in the realm of art and in that of science and knowledge. Education must essay the task of bringing to light and of developing the genuinely social values and possibilities that lurk in the economic activities, the artistic endeavors, and the cognitive interests of man.

To the thoroughly informal and cordial hospitality of the Department of Philosophy of the State University of Iowa, the Association felt itself greatly indebted. For Friday noon, a luncheon was arranged at the Hotel Jefferson. Friday evening, the members and visiting friends were the guests of the University of Iowa at a dinner in the Triangle Club. There was a brief dinner programme, which was placed in the charge of Professor Patrick, who called for brief addresses, in turn, upon Professors Tufts, Schaub and Bode. On Saturday noon, Dean and Mrs. Seashore entertained the Association at an enjoyable luncheon in their home.

At the business meeting on Saturday noon, a report was rendered by the "Committee on the Federation of Philosophical Associations." Resolutions were adopted as follows:

First: That a committee be appointed to confer with the committee of the American Philosophical Association in the interest of formulating a workable plan of union or federation of the several philosophical associations of the United States.

Second: That, as an Association, we favor some such plan as that presented by our committee to the American Philosophical Association (published in the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, December 5, 1918); but that we are willing to enter into a less binding or formal or a more provisional type of association than is there offered should this seem advisable to the joint committee.

Third: That, in case the American Philosophical Association, at its annual meeting for the year 1920, adopts as a part of its name the annexed words "Eastern Branch," we empower our officers elect to change the name of our association to "American Philosophical

Association, Central Branch;'' thereby expressing the assumption that we have formed at least a nominal union with the American Association.

Fourth: That we recommend for the consideration of the joint committee the following propositions: (A) that biennially or triennially there shall be held a Congress of the several Philosophical Associations, or branch associations. (B) That the date of such Congress should fall some time during the summer, preferably in early September. (C) That the place chosen for such Congress should be an attractive vacation or summering place, or, if the conditions seem to favor, some college or university. (D) That a feature of each Congress should be one or two series of lectures or a symposium to be arranged by the joint committee. (E) That the first such Congress be held in the eastern part of the United States in September, 1920, and that the committee of this association be empowered to act with committees of the American and Southern associations for the arrangement and supervision of the meeting, subject to similar authorization of the committees of the American and Southern Associations by their respective memberships.

The existing Committee on Federation was continued with the addition of the new president of the association, Norman Wilde.

The officers elected for 1919–20 are as follows: *President,* Norman Wilde; *Vice-President,* J. E. Boodin; *Secretary and Treasurer,* E. L. Schaub; *additional members of the Executive Committee,* J. F. Crawford, M. C. Otto, A. W. Moore, R. W. Sellars. There were elected to membership Professor Glanville Terrell, of the University of Kentucky, and Professor Leal A. Headley, of Carleton College.

In acceptance of an invitation from the University of Wisconsin, it was voted to hold the next meeting in Madison, Wis., on the Friday and Saturday immediately preceding Easter Day in 1920.

The treasurer's account showed a balance of $67.42 in the savings account, of $47.64 in cash and in the checking account, and of $200 in War Savings Stamps, bought at a cost of $167.38.

Papers read at the meeting are, in subject and abstract, as follows:

The Logical Approach to Functionalism: D. T. HOWARD.

Psychophysical parallelism, in spite of the severe criticism to which it has been subjected in modern times, continues to be a favored doctrine in psychology. It is considered, not merely a safe and sane refuge from the difficulties of interactionism and epiphenomenalism, but a good working hypothesis. Psychophysical theory is grounded on dualism, and meaningless without it. In the field

of sensation this type of theory would seem to have justified itself by its results. The critics of parallelism, however, ought to be able to show that it fails even in this field, for if it be fundamentally unsound it should betray its weakness wherever employed. The line of least resistance in dealing with psychological parallelism leads to the sensation itself. What is meant by asserting that colors, sounds, and similar phenomena are mental? Probably this, that such phenomena lie outside the chain of causally connected things that constitute the "objective" world. Sensations do possess, however, a diagnostic and explanatory value which proves them to be real members of the real world. It is an error, then, to regard the physical and the psychical as two unlike and incommensurable types of being. Functionalism advances beyond structuralism by reinstating the "dependent" facts of experience as members of an internally organized world. Behavior is defined as a form of response to objects which, as embodying both subjective and objective factors, are forever relative to response. The essential logic of functionalism, therefore, is organic rather than causal. Functionalism tends, however, to remain at the biological standpoint, whose categories are too crude to express the subtleties of the higher thought processes. Meaning, for instance, can only be understood by reference to the infinitely complex organization which unites the manifold items of experience into one rational whole. This organization, without which life would lose its sanity, must be called simply *mental,* and the business of psychology, as a distinct science, is to discover and formulate the nature of the mental organization of experience.

Thomistic Realism and Modern Idealism: E. L. HINMAN.

The moderate realism of the neo-scholastic followers of Thomas Aquinas, especially as represented by Dr. Coffey may profitably be compared with the regular development of modern idealism. In fundamental respects, the two movements are identical. As Thomism unfolds, however, a misunderstanding arises, which results in a spurious opposition between the two lines of thought. The Thomist erroneously conceives that the idealist is holding to the *esse-percipi* doctrine. Now the real motive of idealism is not this, but is rather the conception that each individual thing, each idea, and each pulse of experience, is instinct with the life of the universe, that it finds its truth and reality in the completion of the process which it implies but only partially displays. This seems to be an Aristotelian rather than a Berkelian motive, and ought to be available for the followers of Thomas. Failing to recognize this, the neo-scholastic strives to vindicate the objectivity of our judg-

ments in an assertive and dogmatic manner. The result is that the Thomistic theory of perception gets into difficulties that might have been avoided, and reaches a result that is wooden and in need of re-interpretation.

Negation in Traditional and Modern Logic: R. C. LODGE.

1. Traditional doctrine: Negation on a par with affirmation, and objective. Modern doctrine: Negation not on a par with affirmation, but subjective and indefinite.—Is this a flat contradiction, or can both positions be accepted?

2. (*a*) The distinction between affirmative and negative as propositional forms, is superficial. Any judgment (apprehension of objective relations) can be expressed indifferently in either form. (*b*) The nature of judgment itself, as apprehension of reality. Does such apprehension admit of a distinction into affirmative and negative? (*c*) No such distinction possible. We can distinguish between judgment and absence of judgment (failure to judge)—*i. e.,* between judgment and the negation of judgment—but not between a judgment which is affirmative and a judgment which is negative. (*d*) Corollary of this position: There is no such thing as a *duplex negatio.* Not-to-judge (the first "negation") completely excludes us from the sphere of judgment. We can not "negate a negation."

3. The traditional distinction between affirmative and negative, and the modern distinction between judgment and absence of judgment, represent radically different problems, arising at different levels of logical reflection. There is no clash, for there is no common ground. Both traditional and modern positions can thus be accepted.

The Function of Philosophy in Social Reconstruction. A Symposium: A. H. LLOYD, J. H. TUFTS, G. T. W. PATRICK, G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

A. H. LLOYD. (Paper to be published in full in a subsequent issue of this JOURNAL.)

J. H. TUFTS.

The underlying social and political philosophy of our country has been well described by Professor Perry as democracy in both its aspects; on the one hand, equality with freedom; on the other, self-government with the representation of various interests. In a fairly homogeneous people with open classes, a philosophy of freedom with majority rule has seemed to meet the situation. The war has brought a new consciousness of power with reference both to the

achievements of science and of collective action. This latter shows itself conspicuously in the increase of class consciousness of labor and other groups, and in the conception of production as a national enterprise. Class conscious groups will claim not merely greater income but more definite representation and greater power. Philosophy is therefore likely to be called upon increasingly to interpret the meanings and responsibilities of power as it has hitherto done in the case of freedom. It may (1) enlarge and refine the conceptions of both goods and power which now seem within the grasp of classes not accustomed to them; (2) develop the value of power through cooperation as contrasted with power of mastery over others; (3) develop the conception of responsibility. If organizations of capital and of labor are given greater power we can then more appropriately hold them responsible for results whereas at present both sides disclaim responsibility for poverty, unjust distribution, violence, *etc.*

G. T. W. PATRICK.

There can be no sound and sane social reconstruction not based on an accurate knowledge of the instincts, passions and primal interests of the human unit of which society is composed. Recent studies in social, dynamic and behaviorist psychology have made available a fund of knowledge most vital to the social reconstructionist, but of which he has availed himself but little. No one proposing any radical change in our social and political institutions can afford to be ignorant of the works of such writers as Thorstein Veblen, Carleton H. Parker, Thorndike, Cannon, Ross, McDougall, Watson, Freud and Prince.

In practise, however, the social reconstruction schemes now so widely prevalent are based hardly at all on a study of human nature, but are idealistic plans for the introduction of certain social and political machinery designed to correct certain conspicuous *evils* in our present system, such as the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity, war between nations (little is said about civil war or internal disorder), political and economic discrimination against women, *etc.* In general, the direction taken by our thought at the present time is almost exclusively economic and political, and our attempts to reconstruct the social order have in view only economic and political relations to the neglect of the larger interests of *life.*

This makes our reconstruction schemes somewhat idealistic and visionary, since it is by no means certain that the actual man with a mass of inherited instincts, interests and needs will live or work contentedly in a standardized economic world under scientific management and the rule of efficiency. If one should read Carleton

H. Parker's list of sixteen human instincts, for instance, one might doubt whether any of them would find adequate satisfaction in the reign of universal peace, universal work, universal equality, and universal economic prosperity that our social reconstruction plans contemplate. In the society of the future we picture men working six or eight hours a day at fully adequate wages, reserving eight hours for sleep and enjoying eight or ten hours of leisure for self-improvement and recreation. War is to be absent, men and women equal, alcohol abolished and all are to be contented and happy.

The actual man, however, the man known to the psychologist, the anthropologist and the historian, has quite a different set of instincts and desires. He has been, through all his history, not a steady worker, but a fighter and exploiter. Life to him is not work and leisure and sleep. Life is struggle, adventure, love, power, competition. Instincts of loyalty, leadership, love of excitement, ownership, constructive and creative workmanship, are powerful factors in human life and must in some way be provided for in the society of the future. Our social reconstruction plans provide for work and wages and safety and equality; but men love play and danger and risk, with a chance to gain or lose. The really happy man is not one who works six or eight hours a day in a government-owned factory, but one who is working twelve hours a day on some invention or machine which he hopes will bring him fame and fortune. Land to *till* for his daily bread is not what man wants, but the *ownership* of land.

No one doubts that the political and economic inequalities of our present social system must be corrected. But they will not be corrected by the sudden introduction of a social system that makes provision only for economic justice and not for the satisfaction of fundamental human instincts. To change these primal instincts will take centuries, and the really fundamental thing in reconstruction, therefore, is education, physical and moral health and training, eugenic control, and the providing of leaders with expert knowledge and high moral standards.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

It is generally agreed that the world war inaugurated a new era in human history. This new era must inevitably bring its numerous perplexing problems, the solution of which will demand of us all the power of penetration and analysis we are able to command. Many are enthusiastically laboring to make stable the foundations of the social structure, but our counsel is divided as to the goal to be attained and consequently as to the methods which should be employed in its attainment. What is most needed at present is

a clear understanding of the basal elements of social progress: no programme of social reconstruction can be of any great value unless it springs from clearly conceived fundamental principles. Prerequisite to all efforts at social reform there must be an analysis of the main tendencies of the situation with which we are confronted and which we are struggling to remedy, accompanied by an evaluation of the significance and implications of these tendencies. Such an analysis and evaluation necessarily involve a study of the nature of the social order itself. For our conception of the social order must be the criterion in terms of which our evaluation will be made; most of the practical questions which are before us to-day for answer, questions of internationalism, labor, government, groups within states, *etc.*, are logically secondary and derivative, and can hardly be answered apart from a rather full consideration of the generic concept of the social order. A study of the nature of the social order has not yet been made with sufficient definiteness and objectivity to serve the needs of the present situation. Such a study will necessarily lead on to the problem of the nature of the individual; for the social order can not be grasped in its profoundest significance apart from a thorough analysis of the characteristics of the individual of whose life it is the manifestation.

The Social Purpose of Education: H. W. WRIGHT. (Presidential address, to be published in full.)

Natural Law and the Moral Ideal: B. H. BODE.

In the November number of the *Harvard Law Review*, Justice O. W. Holmes, in an article entitled "Natural Law," defends the thesis that, since there are no absolute standards of conduct, there can be no principle of evaluation at all, except that of struggle and survival. Back of his argument lies the assumption that desires and tendencies are fixed, so that problems of conduct are concerned exclusively with the selection of means to the realization of ends that are predetermined. This standpoint allows no room for intelligence and does not tally with the facts. The development of the child and the control exercised by man over nature both show experimental determination of both ends and means. The position is in the end just a defense of another absolute standard. At the present time its likeness to traditional views is more important than its difference, since all these standards show a tendency to operate in the same way and to exclude intelligence from the direction of conduct.

The Two Ideals: M. C. OTTO.

The supreme philosophical task of the hour is the achievement of a concept of individuality and of society which shall mean the

mutual enrichment of both; a concept of individuality which in the process of its realization shall enrich the common life and a concept of society whose chief function shall be the liberation of the individual's unique potentialities. Suggested social reforms are worthless unless they are based upon the facts of human nature. Man, however, is not a creature of one impulse. He is the center of a variety of inpulses, with a more or less permanent bias in favor of one of them. At present the dominant impulse in the case of the vast majority is the impulse to possess. But the war has made it transparent that we are betrayed by a deceptive ideal. We must discover and put into practise a new idealism or face the ruin of what we call civilization. And a promising step in the direction of a better world is a new orientation of life in which the acquisitive impulse is dethroned in favor of the impulse to create. This is not a simple matter, but who shall say it can not be done by men and women who could stage a world war? Indeed, beginnings have already been made in industry and in public education which give a measure of creative opportunity to those who have heretofore been deprived of initiative, adventure, and growth. This is the direction of hope.

The General Will: EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

Some difficulties in the conception of a "general will," as commonly identified with the activity of the State, may be informally presented. Rousseau's account is unsatisfactory. His real meaning for it seems to be the determination to exercise free and rational judgment; but he does not succeed in expressing this meaning. Hegel identifies the purpose of the State with complete rationality, and makes the State supreme in every respect above all other institutions. This is contrary to the experience of any one who has lived in a Church with a strong and distinctive life of its own; it is especially contrary to the history of the State in this country, where it has been founded and shaped by ecclesiastical and commercial organizations. Bosanquet's defense of the Hegelian position is much more cautious, particularly in his recent writing on this subject. But it appears that he still holds that the State is the only institution or group qualified to criticize and adjust the claims and activities of other groups, and to use force for this purpose. Three questions are suggested: (1) Does this theory sufficiently recognize the use of various kinds of "force" by different groups? (2) Do not other institutions and groups criticize the state, and use "force" of various kinds in doing so? (3) Is not the "state" sometimes a name for the actual success of some group in the use of "force"? Suggestive examples of the difficulties connected with these ques-

tions may be found in the intervention of the Federal courts in the dynamite conspiracy of certain officials of the Structural Iron-workers' Union, and in the Kentucky night-rider cases, some years ago; and, on the other hand, in the recent capture of the state government of North Dakota by the Non-Partisan League. Many of the same people who heartily approved federal intervention in the cases cited seem to be ready to use violence themselves against the perfectly legal operations of the League through the state government.

Plural Sovereignty: NORMAN WILDE.

Some reflections on the reasonings of the political pluralists, especially those of Laski and Cole, with the conclusion that the attempt to establish the theory of plural sovereignty, whether by proof of the actual failure of the state to maintain itself as against other organizations, or by evidence of the functional differences and coordination of groups within a given geographical area, fails because of its lack of recognition of the necessary demand for unity in the life of reason, as well as by the arbitrariness of its limitation of the function of the state. One may escape from the state and its sovereignty by taking refuge in anarchy, but, as long as one retains the conception of sovereignty at all, its unity in a state is inevitable.

The Unit of Civilization: J. E. BOODIN.

The last century has been noted for its tendency to integration in human enterprise, especially in the political and economic realms. But with the integration there has not been a corresponding articulation. The result has been an increasing impersonalism and mechanism, the revolt against which is showing itself in a new process of disintegration, political and economic. From the point of view of culture contribution, the large impersonal units are disappointing. The quest for power and the quest for the good are not congenial companions. The best results in culture seem to be obtained when the unit of control approximates the moral unit, *i. e.*, the personal group, as in ancient Athens, the Italian city republics of the later Middle Ages and some of the small European nations of to-day. Smallness, however, is not the only qualification. The group must have sufficient spiritual complexity within and sufficient contacts without. There must be conflict of ideals in order to stimulate latent genius. The group must be animated by a high purpose. And, finally, the material resources must be adequate for the encouraging of the best cultural efforts. Instead of losing ourselves in a vague internationalism, we need a new emphasis on localism, provincialism and nationalism, with cooperation for more

general ends such as police protection and commerce, but with an intense rivalry in those spiritual pursuits which constitute the ultimate ends of civilization.

EDWARD L. SCHAUB.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke. STERLING POWER LAMPRECHT. New York: Columbia University Press. 1918. Pp. viii + 168.

Aristotle's division of philosophy into theoretical and practical has, in one respect, proved to be a great misfortune. It has introduced a split into our thinking, a split which, one may venture the suggestion, has been the source of most of the unfortunate dualisms which have since prevailed, such, for example, as that of labor and leisure, the cultural and the vocational, the scientific and the humanistic. The real source of mischief is not so much the distinction, but the decided preference in favor of the theoretical as inherently superior to and qualitatively more excellent than the practical. This distinction, with its corresponding evaluation, has led to great disproportionateness in the writing of philosophy. Modern philosophy shows a woeful neglect of the practical; it is concerned almost exclusively with "theories" of knowledge. Not only that, but the historians of philosophy have neglected the practical aspects even where the philosophers themselves have manifested a practical interest. Höffding, for example, in his *History of Modern Philosophy,* devotes just twice as much space to an analysis of Book I. of Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature,* the Book on the "Understanding," as he does to Books II. and III. together, the Books on the "Passions" and on "Morals." Falckenberg devotes more than twenty-one pages to Locke's "theory of knowledge" and less than five to his "practical" philosophy.

There is at present, however, a growing tendency to emphasize the practical and to relate philosophy to the social and political sciences. As a result of this emphasis there is a growing demand for a reconstruction of some of the classical philosophers who have written a practical philosophy, but which has been much neglected. The need for a revision of historical perspective in the light of the practical is nowhere greater than in the case of the classical British philosophers, especially Locke and Hume.

The present monograph by Dr. Lamprecht on *The Moral and*

Political Philosophy of John Locke is an attempt, and an extraordinarily successful one, to bring the moral, social and political thinking of Locke into relation to his general theory of knowledge and thus to exhibit Locke's interests in a complete synthesis. No writer has suffered more from an unwise selection than Locke. As a matter of fact Locke's dominant interests were always practical, and this, as Dr. Lamprecht points out, as much with regard to the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* as the *Treatises of Government* or *Thoughts concerning Education.*

Dr. Lamprecht has divided his work into three Books. Book I. deals with "The Traditions in Moral and Political Philosophy Before the Time of Locke." It has been too frequently supposed that Locke wrote quite originally and independently of his predecessors. Quite the opposite is true. "Though he added new ideas of his own and developed the old ideas which he took over from others, he is rather the ripe fulfilment of the past than the herald of the future."[1] In treating of Locke's historical antecedents, the writer gives a brief but excellent account of the early writers of the Law of Nature, the Deists of the seventeenth century, Hobbes and Filmer.

Book II. deals with "The Moral Philosophy of Locke." What baffles most critics of Locke is his inconsistencies. In this book the author is chiefly concerned with an account of the rationalistic and hedonistic elements in Locke's ethics with an estimation of the relation between them. The problem is quite analogous to the problem of the relation between rationalism and empiricism in the *Essay.* All that one can say is that these antitheses had not become prominent at the time of Locke, at least not objects of heated controversy as they subsequently became. Locke's moral ideas involve both rationalistic and hedonistic elements. The most nearly consistent account of Locke's moral theory is to be found in *Thoughts concerning Education.*

Book III., dealing with "The Social and Political Philosophy of Locke," treats of "Locke's Theory of the State of Nature," "Locke's Theory of Political Society," and "Locke's Theories of Toleration and Punishment." Locke's political philosophy is consistently rationalistic, but entirely practical. On its rationalistic side it is based on the doctrine of natural rights, a doctrine closely affiliated with the rationalistic science of the seventeenth century. On its practical side, it is intended as a justification of the Revolution of 1688, the gist of which is that if a right is inalienable it simply can not be given up in passing from a pre-political to political society.

Dr. Lamprecht's monograph is certainly the most thorough and

[1] *The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke,* p. 6.

exhaustive study of Locke's practical philosophy which has yet appeared. Its chief value consists in the placing of Locke's interests in a correct historical perspective, and in the re-affirmation of the practical as of ranking importance with the theoretical. There is not so much in Locke to clarify contemporary political problems. The doctrine of natural rights is now out of date, and political democracy, for which Locke wrote so ably, is now fairly well established. The contemporary need is for an industrial democracy. What is of most pertinent contemporary application is Locke's view of toleration.

M. T. McCLURE.

TULANE UNIVERSITY.

Social Process. CHARLES HORTON COOLEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. vi + 430.

This book is a collection of essays, most of them intended evidently for the "general reader," giving the author's mature judgments upon a variety of sociological questions. The unifying theme which gives the book its title, and which is most explicitly treated in the first and the last (seventh) parts, is the same that ran through the author's two previous books. All the facts of human life are parts of a process which is organic, social, living and growing. In order to understand a living process the investigator needs to participate in it; when not an actual participant he should imagine himself in it, with the sympathetic insight of the artist, the dramatist. The author himself is eminently successful with this method, showing deep insight into the behavior of all living creatures, from a grape-vine (p. 8) to a modern capitalist.

Part II. is a series of literary essays, dealing with such topics as success, fame, the competitive spirit and discipline. Part III. is on Degeneration. Even the degenerate is treated as a man whom we can not understand without putting ourselves in his place. Degeneration is found in all classes of the population; it may be caused by wealth as well as by poverty. Part IV., on Social Factors in Biological Survival, is very elementary. Part V. deals with Group Conflict. The problems of the abolition of war and the establishment of a new international order, of the conflict of classes and of races, are each accorded a few pages of wise and scholarly advice.

Part VI., on Valuation, is, more than any of the other parts, of interest to the advanced scholar. It consists of four chapters which are reprints, with slight changes, of articles that appeared in the *Psychological Bulletin, American Journal of Sociology,* and *Quarterly Journal of Economics.* The first makes an interesting distinction between human nature values and institutional values. The

other three deal with pecuniary valuation. The ideal market would be an institution for the measurement and exchange of values of every sort. Why is it that our actual market falls so far short of the ideal, that it so often measures values falsely, and that it fails in great degree to measure the higher values at all? The answer is that the imperfections of the market, like the imperfections of any other institution, are due largely to historical origins, to lack of flexibility, and to administration by a special class of persons. Pecuniary valuation can be improved, not by taking the higher values out of the market, but by putting them into it. And conversely, the higher values, such as those of scholarship, can be more justly appraised and more adequately paid for only by getting them into the market.

Read by the general public, this book will do great good by disseminating Professor Cooley's wise and broad-minded views on many problems of private and public life. As reading for students it is inferior to the author's two earlier books, for it is too general, it treats no problem thoroughly, and it may encourage some students in their neglect of "mere" facts and of expert knowledge and training. The author—and in this he is not alone among sociologists—fails especially to recognize the philosophical sciences as sources of expert knowledge regarding matters upon which an undisciplined opinion has no value. This is shown by his unrestrained discourses upon many philosophical topics, including the method of science, mechanism, organic wholes, freedom, creative process, moral good, God and the universe. He intimates, it is true, that he has no desire to discuss metaphysics, and that his method of treating these topics is that of "common sense;" but this only shows the more clearly his failure to recognize that the matters in question are philosophical, and that they can be adequately investigated only by the philosophical sciences.

WALLACE CRAIG.

UNIVERSITY OF MAINE.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. January, 1919. *An Experimental Study of "Feelings of Relation"* (pp. 1–26): JOSEPHINE M. GLEASON.—The experiments show that there are no mental pattern or elements that can clearly be identified as feelings of relation. *The Psychology of Native Sons* (pp. 27–39): HARLOW GALE.—Native Sons are in danger of becoming the victims of petty reminiscence. They need the broader outlook through education and travel. With the proper insights and sense of proportion Native Sons can develop into a strong type of American citizen-

ship. *The Speed of Adjustment of the Eye for Clear Seeing at Different Distances* (pp. 40–61): C. E. FERREE and GERTRUDE RAND.—An apparatus for the testing of the speed of adjustment is described. There is a wide range of individual variation. *An Anomalous Case of Simple Reaction* (pp. 62–65): E. B. TITCHNER.—The case of a very long reaction time to auditory stimulus is presented. *Authorship of the Book of Mormon* (pp. 66–72): THEODORE SCHROEDER.—The author disagrees with Walter P. Prince, whose article of the same title appeared in the *American Journal of Psychology* for July, 1917. The psychologic tests and analysis are criticized and fail in the light of historic evidence. *Emerson's Transcendentalism* (pp. 73–82): REGIS MICHAND.—Replying to Professor Girard's arguments that Emerson was not a true Transcendentalist, he is presented as its great American leader. A fixed and limited standard by which to judge the Transcendental movement is impossible. *Superstitious Belief and Practise among College Students* (pp. 83–102): EDMUND S. CONKLIN.—More than half of the college students admitted having superstitious beliefs. Women had more superstitions than the men. *The Psychology of Figures of Speech* (pp. 103–115): JUNE DOWNEY.—The mental basis of figurative language is the substitution of one object of thought for another. This substitution gives rise to esthetic pleasure. *Book Notes.*

Wallis, Wilson D. Messiahs: Christian and Pagan. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1918. Pp. 276. $2.00.

NOTES AND NEWS

THE twentieth Summer Session of Columbia University, which closes on August 15th, has had a record attendance of 9,726. In philosophy and psychology there has been a great variety of courses offered, both by those regularly members of the faculty of the University and those visiting from outside institutions. Since the major interest of many summer session students lies in the field of education, a large part of the psychology offering was made through Teachers College and stressed the educational application of the subject. The courses given in these two departments were as follows:

PHILOSOPHY.

Principles of Scientific Method. DR. SCHNEIDER, of Columbia.
Introduction to Philosophy. DR. SCHNEIDER.
Human Nature and Social Organization. PROFESSOR MCCLURE, of Tulane University.

Philosophy and Literature. PROFESSOR MCCLURE.

Democratic Ideals: their historical origins, philosophical foundations, and reconstructive programmes. PROFESSOR H. B. ALEXANDER, of the University of Nebraska.

French Humanitarianism. PROFESSOR ALEXANDER.

Radical, Conservative and Reactionary Tendencies in Present-Day Morals. PROFESSOR MONTAGUE, of Columbia.

Present-Day Philosophy and the Problem of Evolution. PROFESSOR MONTAGUE.

PSYCHOLOGY

Elements of Psychology. PROFESSOR WOODWORTH, of Columbia.

Introduction to Psychology. PROFESSOR WOODWORTH.

Social Psychology. PROFESSOR WOODWORTH.

Experimental Psychology. DR. POFFENBERGER, of Columbia.

Applied Psychology. DR. POFFENBERGER.

Abnormal Psychology. PROFESSOR H. L. HOLLINGWORTH, of Columbia.

Mental Measurement. PROFESSOR H. L. HOLLINGWORTH.

Laboratory Work. PROFESSORS WOODWORTH and HOLLINGWORTH, and DR. POFFENBERGER.

Educational Psychology. PROFESSORS RUGER and WHITLEY, of Columbia.

Principles of Education. PROFESSOR MADDOX and DR. REISNER, of Columbia.

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